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Human supremacy as posthuman risk
Daniel Estrada
New Jersey Institute of Technology
Human supremacy is the widely held view that human interests ought to be
privileged over other interests as a matter of ethics and public policy.
Posthumanism is the historical situation characterized by a critical reevaluation of
anthropocentrist theory and practice. This paper draws on animal studies, Rosi
Braidotti’s critical posthumanism, and the critique of ideal theory in Charles Mills
and Serene Khader to address the appeal to human supremacist rhetoric in AI
ethics and policy discussions, particularly in the work of Joanna Bryson. This
analysis identifies a specific risk posed by human supremacist policy in a
posthuman context, namely the classification of agents by type.

Keywords: AI ethics, posthuman, animal studies, robot studies, ideal
theory

Against the backdrop of numerous political scandals, ethical violations,
and calls for regulatory oversight in the field of artificial intelligence
(Whittaker et al., 2018), the rhetorical framework of the “human” has
become an increasingly visible shorthand for industry and public policy
projects to signal a concern for safety, ethical integrity, and the
responsible use of the AI. Several recent public policy proposals on AI
bear titles such as “AI for Humanity” in France;1 “HumaneAI” in the EU;2
“AI4People”, Luciano Floridi’s proposal describing “An ethical framework
for a good AI society” (Floridi et al., 2018), and Stanford’s “Institute for
Human-Centered AI,” whose welcome page proudly proposes that “AI is to
serve the collective needs of humanity.”3
In these contexts, centering the “human” as the explicit focus of normative
concern projects the appearance of an inclusive framework of shared
values and common interests that guide the collective use of AI. More
subtly, these proposals consistently frame AI as categorically subservient
to human interests. Unsurprisingly, these proposals don’t define the scope
or content of the “human,” how membership in this category is to be
determined, or what underpins its role as a focal norm in AI policy. Still, AI
is regularly used to target, manipulate, incarcerate, and exploit vulnerable
populations, as seen in the use of facial recognition technologies in
1

https://www.aiforhumanity.fr

2

https://www.humane-ai.eu/

3

https://hai.stanford.edu/
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policing and military operations, election tampering and voter manipulation
on social media, and software that automates criminal sentencing, loan
approval, hiring decisions, and so on (Williams, 2019b; Spiel et al., 2019;
Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; Asaro, 2016;
Angwin et al., 2016; Benjamin, 2016). Given these realities, how can we
trust that policies which center the “human” will also center us? It is
difficult to see how technologies used to expand, reinforce, and make
more profitable these pervasive institutions of violence and oppression
could operate against a shared background of values common to all
humanity. Rosi Braidotti quotes Tony Davies: “All humanisms, until now,
have been imperial” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 15). From this perspective, the
attempt to signal a commitment to integrity by appeal to the category
“human” reads as more of the empty ethics-washing that has come to
characterize the field (Metzinger, 2019).
Absent from these human-centered proposals is any engagement with the
decades of sustained scholarship in feminist, postcolonial, and critical race
theory (Jackson, 2020; Deckha, 2012; Mills, 2011; Hayles, 2008; Said,
2004; D. Haraway, 1989, 1991), animal rights and environmental ethics
(Belcourt, 2015; Gaard, 2011; Steiner, 2010; Katz, 2000); STS, HCI, and
design theory (Thomas et al., 2017; Kera et al., 2009; Latour, 2003), and
related fields that have developed systematic critiques of
anthropocentrism and the politics of the “human.” Among the important
insights of this diverse literature is the recognition that a superficial appeal
to inclusive universalism can be used to justify and provide cover for
narrowly self-serving, exclusive, or imperialist practices (Khader, 2018;
Giraldo, 2016). As Charles Mills puts the point, “historically and still
currently, most humans were not and are not socially recognized persons,
or, more neatly and epigrammatically put: most persons are non-persons”
(Mills, 2011). Confronting such duplicitous ideologies presents difficult
conceptual, rhetorical, and practical challenges, suggesting that care
should be taken in the use of universalizing language if it is used at all.
The uncritical deployment in AI policy of human-centered rhetoric as a
pretense to ethical integrity speaks not only as a tacit endorsement of its
imperialist undertones, but more loudly as utter disregard for those
scholars and activists who have been consistently engaged with the
“human” as a normative ground.
This paper seeks to correct these omissions and provoke the AI
community to adopt a more reflective, informed, and critical perspective on
the way human-centered rhetoric can function as a cheap proxy for ethical
integrity. To these ends we engage the work of Joanna Bryson, prominent
scholar, public speaker, and policy consultant in AI ethics, and author of
the paper “Robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010a). In this and several
other essays (Bryson & Kime, 1998, 2011; Bryson, Diamantis, & Grant,
2017; Bryson, 2011, 2018a, 2018b), Bryson and colleagues construct a
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vision of the ethical use of AI that renders these technologies as an
explicit social underclass modelled after the historical institutions of
slavery and domestic servitude. This rendering of the “human” as
categorically dominant over artificial agents in virtue of our kind is the
target of this analysis of “human supremacy.” Reading Bryson through
recent scholarship on posthumanism and anthropocentrism, and
especially through the lens of critical race and postcolonial studies, does
not merely raise a set of objections to the tone and content of her work. It
also offers a case study on the relative ease with which ideologies of
oppression can develop from what might seem like an innocuous ethical
commitment that puts the “human” first.
Bryson is by no means alone in her explicit endorsement of the
institutionalized slavery of machines (Petersen, 2007, 2012). Oscar Wilde
anticipates the position as early as 1891: “Human slavery is wrong,
insecure, and demoralising. On mechanical slavery, on the slavery of the
machine, the future of the world depends” (Wilde, 1891). Ruha Benjamin
presents a striking example of human supremacist rhetoric in an article
from Mechanix Illustrated from 1965 that predicts “Slavery will be back!
We’ll all have personal slaves again… Don’t be alarmed. We mean robot
‘slaves’.” Benjamin notes that “It goes without saying that readers, so
casually hailed as “we,” are not the descendants of those whom Lincoln
freed” (Benjamin, 2019, p. 56). This comment helps locate the matrix of
oppression, artificial agency, and group identity addressed in this critical
evaluation of human supremacy. Benjamin continues:
For those of us who believe in a more egalitarian notion of power, of collective
empowerment without domination, how we imagine our relation to robots offers a
mirror for thinking through and against race as technology. (2019, p. 56ff)

This paper is presented in solidarity with those who share this commitment
to collective empowerment.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by introducing the term
“human supremacy” as it appears in the animal advocacy literature, and
we take on the conceptual and interpretive challenges the term invites in
its application to AI ethics. We go on to sketch Bryson’s human-centered
approach to AI ethics as a paradigm case of human supremacy,
addressing its theoretical grounding and consequences for policy. With
Bryson’s views unpacked, we then turn to two resources to understand
them: Rosi Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism in Martha
Nussbaum, and the critique of ideal theory in Charles Mills and Serene
Khader. This scaffolding helps uncover the ideological and institutional
foundations for Bryson’s position, and points to an alternative approach
that emphasizes the nonideal conditions within which subjectivity and
community operate. The paper closes with reflections on the risks of

Published by ODU Digital Commons, 2020

3

The Journal of Sociotechnical Critique, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5

human supremacist politics in a posthuman age, specifically concerning
the classification of agents by type.

Human supremacy in animal justice and AI ethics
Human supremacy is the view that human interests ought to be
systematically privileged over other interests as a matter of public policy.
The term derives from activist-scholars in animal rights and environmental
ethics (Crist, 2017; Lupinacci, 2015; Steiner, 2010) who object to
anthropocentric policies that neglect the welfare and integrity of nonhuman
biological and ecological systems. Similar terms can be found in, for
instance, Mary Midgley’s “human chauvinism” or “exclusive humanism”
(Midgley, 2003). However, the term “human supremacy” draws on a
deliberately provocative analogy to white supremacy, that pervasive
system of racist structural power and oppression which systematically
privileges the interests of people identified as “white” relative to people
who, for various historical and sociopolitical reasons, are not so identified.
Analogously, human supremacy names those practices which
systematically privilege the “human” relative to the “nonhuman.” The
ideologies of oppression and abject domination indicated by the term
“supremacy” cannot be easily reduced to the prejudiced beliefs or
attitudes that some individuals or groups hold towards others. The
vocabulary of oppression highlights the structural, institutional, and
material realities within which some social groups are systematically
attacked, exploited, and marginalized relative to others. (Frye, 1983;
Young, 1988).
The problematic analogy between white supremacy and the racist
oppression of humans on one hand, and human supremacy and the
anthropocentric oppression of animals and other nonhumans on the other,
has been addressed in critical race studies, critical animal studies, and
ecofeminist literatures (Nocella et al., 2015; Nocella, 2012; Gaard, 2011;
Wise, 2005; Armstrong, 2002). These sources emphasize that the
comparison between oppressed people and industrial livestock is deeply
insensitive to the history of racialized chattel slavery that operated on this
analogy.4 Animal studies scholar Anthony Nocella (2012) argues that
4

Reacting to a series of photo campaigns from the People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA) with titles like “Are animals the new slaves?” and “Holocaust on your
plate,” white anti-racist author Tim Wise explains this insensitivity by appeal to the white
privilege of many animal rights activists:
That PETA can’t understand what it means for a black person to be compared to
an animal, given a history of having been thought of in exactly those terms, isn’t
the least bit shocking. After all, the movement is perhaps the whitest of all
progressive or radical movements on the planet, for reasons owing to the privilege
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members of the animal advocacy movement rarely share a common
experience of oppression, either as a community or with the animals they
advocate for. This points to an important disanalogy between the
(nonhuman) animal rights movement and the ongoing struggles against
racist, sexist, ableist, and colonialist oppression. A nonhuman animal
might maul its captor and escape its bonds, but that animal cannot engage
directly in political resistance without animal activists working on their
behalf. The resistance to the oppression of humans stands in stark
contrast; Nocella quotes political prisoner Jalil Muntaqim, “We are our own
liberators” (Nocella, 2012, p. 148).
To avoid the “white savior complex” the phrase “animal liberation” implies,
Nocella suggests thinking instead of “animal justice,” and appreciating
how interconnected structures of oppression and domination reveals that
“fighting for human animal rights is fighting for nonhuman animal rights”
(Nocella, 2012, p. 150). Greta Gaard (2011) points to efforts in ecofeminist
thought that foreground the intersections of race, class, and ecology, for
example in, “industrialized animal food production and its reliance on
undocumented immigrant workers (who risk deportation if they report
their hazardous workplace conditions)” (Gaard, 2011, p. 36). This does
not imply that human rights and animal advocacy work are always in
alignment. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson notes that,
animal advocacy projects that seek greater legal protection for the Great Apes
and more strenuous criminal prosecution for those who transgress protective
laws find themselves at odds with impoverished peoples in African nations that
have been burdened by World Bank and IMF policies. (Jackson, 2020, p. 15ff)

Nocella offers several recommendations to integrate the work of animal
advocacy more deeply with other struggles to end oppression, including
centering the work of people of color who are engaged in social justice
and animal advocacy; challenging one’s own whiteness, domination, and
elitism;5 and resisting the comparison between forms of oppression “if that

one must possess in order to focus on animal rights as opposed to, say, surviving
oneself from institutional oppression. (Wise, 2005, as quoted in Nocella, 2012)
5

While I do not identify as white, I am a straight cisgendered able-bodied man with an
education and a full-time teaching position at a public technical institute, and these
advantages put me in a position of privilege relative to many oppressed and marginalized
people. These advantages have allowed me the opportunity to address the social status
of artificial agents as a philosophical and scholar-activist project, an opportunity made
possible by the very same social structures that are systematically targeting Latinx
members of my communities in Southern California for detention and deportation. I would
like to acknowledge that this research was done during the tragic expansion of for-profit
concentration camps at the border that have kept innocent people in terrible conditions
and have separated thousands of children from their parents. Revisions for this article
were completed during a pandemic, and amidst worldwide Black Lives Matter
demonstrations in protest of police violence and systematic injustice.
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comparison is not met with action, and is not examined for the purpose of
understanding the oppressor” (Nocella, 2012, p. 152).
Nocella’s advice applies equally well to the potentially insensitive
comparisons the term “human supremacy” invites in the context of artificial
agents and AI.6 It is important to keep in mind that the discourse around
the “human” arises in the AI literature at the same time as egregious
ethical failures in both industry and public policy that disproportionately
impact the lives of people who have already been marginalized and
exploited by racism and white supremacy, sexism and patriarchy,
transphobia, ableism, nationalist xenophobia, capitalism, and other forms
of systemic oppression (Keyes et al., 2019; Bardzell & Bardzell, 2015;
Irani et al., 2010). A critical inquiry into the institutionalized abjection that
develops around the use and deployment of robots and AI, or what might
be called critical robot studies, addresses a particularly salient form of
anthropocentric ideology, and aims to resist its careless use in the
defense of systemically oppressive practices in AI ethics. This approach
does not imply a comparison between the (potential) experiences of
artificial agents and the multiple intersecting forms of discrimination and
oppression faced by black and brown people, women and LGBTQIA+
people, and other marginalized groups under white supremacy,
cisheteronormative patriarchy, neoliberal colonialism, and other
entrenched systems of power. Nocella says, “All suffering is different and
is based on individual experience even if the oppressive tactic is the
same” (Nocella, 2012, p. 147). We do not hope to speak on behalf of or
“liberate” robots, nor to merely appropriate the language and culture of
activist movements. Instead, we seek to contribute to the struggle against
all forms of oppression by examining one manifestation of a tactic that
impacts humans and nonhumans alike; namely, the political classification
of agents by type, and the systematic privileging of groups based on
essentializing, hierarchical ontologies (Jackson, 2020; Benjamin, 2016;
Braun, 2014; Reardon, 2009).
We adapt the term “human supremacy” from the context of animal and
environmental advocacy to the field of AI ethics in order to name a
nefarious mode of classification politics that situates the “human” as the
focus of systemic privilege. While humanist or anthropocentric framings
can be found throughout the AI ethics literature, our project is not
condemn the vocabulary of the “human” wherever it appears; as Jackson
says, “To render one’s humanity provisional, where the specter of
The term “AI” and “robot” are used here to include all technologies addressed under the
labels artificial intelligence, machine learning, and robotics, including autonomous
vehicles, drones, and weapons, IoT and “smart” appliances, social media bots and other
artificial software agents (anthropomorphic or not), expert systems and efficient database
management architectures, and related technologies. The vocabulary and taxonomy for
identifying and distinguishing between artificial agents playing various roles remains
unsettled.
6
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nullification looms large, is precisely the work that racism does” (Jackson,
2020, p. 16). Rather, our goal is to uncover the ideologies of oppression
and abject domination that often informs the appeal to humanism as an
ethical ground. Used in this way, the term retains some of its original
meaning and use. Nevertheless, the critique of human supremacy in AI
presents several unique challenges that distinguish it from the animal
advocacy case. One difference is that while anthropocentrism in
environmental policy can be subtle and may require critical or interpretive
efforts to “recognize” (Lupinacci, 2015), in AI human supremacy is often
overt, with the “human” presented as an explicit basis for political alliance,
as we will see in Bryson’s view. To this extent, the term “human
supremacy” functions less as an accusation of covert oppressive behavior
by analogy to racial oppression, and more as a precise description of an
ideology framed in its proponent’s own terms.7
It is worth considering why human-centered politics is so broadly
welcomed in AI ethics, despite the otherwise dismal status of the “human”
in the political climate of the Anthropocene (Ellis, 2015; D. J. Haraway,
2016; Lewis & Maslin, 2015). The literature discusses two justifications
which have, on their surface, relatively little to do with each other: the wellestablished international policy framework of human rights (Latonero,
2018; Risse, 2018), and the presumed metaphysical non-agency of
artifacts like machines and pieces of software (Boden et al., 2017; Fossa,
2018). These justifications will be addressed in later sections through the
lens of Braidotti’s critical posthumanism and Mills’s critique of ideal theory.
However, one version of the second justification should be addressed
before moving from the animal ethics literature.
It is commonly argued that AI is neither biological nor alive, so cannot
suffer like animals and other living creatures, and therefore cannot
participate in a moral community in the relevant way to deserve moral
consideration or critical advocacy. If animal advocacy is primarily
motivated by animal suffering, and if robots cannot suffer, this would
undermine the possibility that robots could stand in need of the sort of
political activism seen in the animal advocacy movement. Such arguments
can be resisted on several grounds. Environmentalists since at least Aldo
Leopold’s Land ethic (1949) have emphasized the value of nonliving
systems like the soil, water, and air that do not “suffer” in the experiential
sense of animals with a nervous system, but which nevertheless are vital
for the integrity of ecological communities, and so warrant a focal role in
The vocabulary of “supremacy” has become popular tech jargon to indicate superiority
in some practical domain, as with the so-called race to “quantum supremacy” (Arute et
al., 2019). This “supremacist” framing pitting humans against bots can be seen regularly
in AI discussions around competitive games, as with bots competing for “poker
supremacy” (Gibney, 2017), or bots that challenge “human supremacy at chess” (Müller
& Schaeffer, 2018).
7
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our norms and practices (Konopka, 2013). Kate Darling notes that while
the philosophical and ethical discussion of animal rights revolves around
issues like pain and consciousness, “our laws indicate that these concerns
are secondary when it comes to legal protections” (Darling, 2016, p. 17).
Instead, Darling argues that laws tend to follow public attitudes towards
animals that do not depend on biological differences, as with laws in the
U.S. that protect horses but not cows from being killed and eaten, despite
few biological differences that could justify this practice. Several scholars
have noted how the emphasis on conscious experiences in AI privilege a
Western European and predominantly Christian perspective on artifacts
and their relationship to nature, ethics and society—a perspective that is
not universally shared (Williams, 2019b; Gunkel, 2018a; Jones, 2015).
Assuming this perspective marginalizes non-Western traditions that do not
operate on an anthropocentric hierarchy of value, such as found in Shinto
(Geraci, 2006), African and African diasporic (Jackson, 2020; Metz, 2017;
Horsthemke, 2017), and First Nations (Pierotti & Wildcat, 2000)
philosophy. Finally, there are the ongoing discriminatory practices in which
biological factors are treated as scientific justification for institutional
oppression based on race, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, or
other essentializing characteristics (Jackson, 2020; Appiah, 2018). Taken
together, these considerations suggest that biological factors alone should
not be treated as prima facie justification for the exclusion of artificial
agents from the moral community.
Nevertheless, the literature on “robot rights” is overwhelmingly
preoccupied with whether robots have internal states sufficiently “like ours”
to warrant social status and legal recognition (Wittkower, forthcoming;
Danaher, 2019; Williams, 2019a, 2018; Gunkel, 2018b; Schwitzgebel &
Garza, 2015).8 The hypercritical focus on the machine’s experiences (or
lack thereof) points to another important distinction between animals and
AI: artificial agents already participate in a variety of sociopolitical contexts
that were formerly the exclusive domain of humans. There already exist
vibrant online communities building, publishing, and critically assessing
the work of bots that write poetry and fiction, create digital images and
videos, compose music, and produce other forms of ‘artistic’ expression
(Hertzmann, 2019; Oliveira, 2017; Compton et al., 2017; Gilani et al.,
2017). Perhaps most well-known are the artificial “influencers” like Lil
Miquela who model fashion brands to millions of followers on social media
These concerns predate Turing’s (1950) proposed “imitation game”. Turing attempts to
respond to these concerns by directing questions away from the machine’s “experience”
and towards the actual conditions of its social performances, including our reactions to
them (Estrada, 2018; Hayles, 2008). Notice how the systematic comparison between
human and machine experiences suggested by the more popular reading of Turing’s test
runs afoul of Nocella’s recommendation to avoid comparing experiences. This is not to
suggest that Turing’s test is morally wrong, but to notice that it creates social
circumstances that are especially hostile to the possibility of recognizing and respecting
artificial agents (Hayes & Ford, 1995).
8
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(Blanton & Carbajal, 2019). These digital communities highlight the
already overlapping sociopolitical circumstances of human and artificial
agents, which are not predicated on some shared biological or
evolutionary background, nor on shared experiences or conscious states,
but more concretely on the material and institutional realities within which
human and nonhuman agents “share existence” (Latour, 2003). Just as
the shared material realities of oppression provide a framework for
collaboration among resistance movements addressing both human and
nonhuman animal interests—despite important differences in the history
and experiences motivating this work—this very same framework for
collaboration provides resources to resist biocentrism, anthropocentrism,
and other essentializing hierarchies as they appear in the discourse
around robots, AI, and artificial agency, despite important differences
between human and artificial agents.
Moreover, unlike nonhuman animals, it is reasonable to expect the
capacities of artificial agents will continue to advance rapidly on relatively
short timescales, at least within some domains. The possibility for radical
near-term changes in the agential capacities of robots suggests their
sociopolitical status will likewise remain unsettled. Peter Asaro notes, “At
some point in the future, robots might simply demand their rights” (Asaro,
2006, p. 12). However, while articulating these demands may require
fundamental changes in the capacities of artificial agents, it will also
require an ethical and interpretive change in our capacities as a society to
respect such demands as potentially legitimate political acts. These
changes in the social imagination don’t require that we wait for
technologies “worthy” of basic consideration. Alan Turing articulated this
perspective in his plea for “fair play for machines” (Turing, 1947; Estrada,
2018a) just as the first general purpose computers inspired by his work
were being constructed in research labs. If the kind of critical selfreflection required to advocate on behalf of machines was available to
Turing, surely it is available to us as well.

Human supremacy in Bryson’s AI ethics
Joanna Bryson’s contributions to the AI ethics literature, especially the
article “Robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010; henceforth RSBS),
provides a useful case study for the critical examination of human
supremacist ideology in AI ethics. RSBS is notable (though, as discussed
earlier, hardly unique) for its unfortunate invocation of the historical
institution of slavery as a model for AI ethics, where “robots should be
servants you own” (p. 3). Bryson would later apologize for this framing
(Bryson, 2015). Still, the set of considerations, drawn mostly from
evolutionary psychology, that lead to proposing slavery as a model for AI
ethics continues to inform Bryson’s work not only as a scholar but also as
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a high-level policy consultant for both government and industry. This
section will present a critical reading of RSBS and related work, to shed
light on the motivation and perspective they develop and the influence
they have had on AI ethics discourse and industry policy. To be clear,
Bryson’s work is not singled out for being egregiously problematic or
offensive. On the contrary, Bryson clearly articulates a mainstream liberal
humanism that is widely endorsed in the field, for which she has received
broad support and recognition. Given the prominence of these views, it is
important to take seriously the ways in which they rely on or perhaps even
require the logic and essentializing hierarchies of white supremacy. In this
section we detail Bryson’s straightforward embrace of the logic of
institutionalized slavery in RSBS and related papers to address these
deeper themes in the AI ethics discourse.
Written nearly a decade before RSBS, Bryson’s earliest contribution to AI
ethics scholarship is the coauthored conference paper, “Just another
artifact: Ethics and the empirical experience of AI” (Bryson & Kime, 1998)
which lays out many of the elements of her considered view. An edited
version of this paper is published in 2011 under the title “Just an artifact:
Why machines are perceived as moral agents” (Bryson & Kime, 2011),
suggesting some continuity of views over this time, the period during
which RSBS was written, presented, and published. As such, these
papers give insight into Bryson’s early views on AI ethics independent of
the overt analogy with slavery developed in RSBS. Bryson & Kime’s
motivation in these papers is to address certain “exaggerated fears”
(Bryson & Kime, 1998, p. 385) from Vernor Vinge and other early
proponents of the Singularity hypothesis, who predict that computers
might soon surpass human intelligence and take over the world (Vinge,
1993). Bryson & Kime argue that these misplaced fears arise from an
“over-identification with machines,” a mistake they say is “symptomatic of
a larger problem—a general confusion about the nature of humanity and
the role of ethics in society” (p. 385). What is the nature of humanity and
the role of ethics in society? The authors claim that “ethics has evolved as
a mechanism of human social cohesion, without which society
disintegrates” (p. 386). They claim the primary mechanism driving social
cohesion is empathy: “we care for people or objects that we would feel
badly for if they were hurt or damaged” (p. 386, emphasis in original). This
feeling of empathy in turn creates a sense of identification with the target
of our concern. The relative strength of this identification generates an
individual’s hierarchy of ethical obligation, “with ourselves and our families
tending to be at the top, followed by our neighbours and other people with
whom we acknowledge commonality” (p. 386). Bryson & Kime infer from
this general picture suggests that “self-interest is the root of our ethics” (p.
387).
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In the case of the Singularity theorists, Bryson & Kime argue that the
mechanisms of social identification have been misapplied to machines.
They explain this confusion by appeal to our tendency to distinguish
ourselves from animals—itself grounded in the evolutionary drive to
empathetic social cohesion. “To form a human society, one needs to value
the lives of humans in the community over the lives of other animals” (p.
386). They argue that a mistaken over-identification with machines “lead[s]
to an undervaluing of the emotional and aesthetic in our society.
Consequences include an unhealthy neglect and denial of emotional
experiences” (p. 387). They identify two dangers of over-identification: “we
may believe the machine to be a participant in our society, which might
seriously confuse our understanding of them,” and “we may over-value the
machine when making our own ethical judgments and balancing our own
obligations” (p. 387). They claim these dangers are not unique to AI, and
that all artifacts have “the potential for misuse, either through carelessness
or malevolence, by the people who control them.” (p. 385) They dismiss
any view that values AI, “to the exclusion of our own existence” as
“nihilism” (p. 390). The most substantial citation offered to support these
claims is Lakoff & Johnson's Metaphors we live by (1980).
There are many reasons for finding these views unsatisfying as an ethical
framework. The direct line drawn between evolutionary psychology and
ethical obligation is underdeveloped and theoretically implausible (Street,
2006). The relationship proposed between empathy and social
identification is, at best, oversimplified (Jenkins, 2014). The view that
artifacts are dangerous only through their misuse or abuse by humans is
known in the philosophy of technology literature as “technological
neutrality” or “instrumentalism,” (Kaplan, 2009), a problematic view as a
policy position in the high tech industry (Reed, 2007; Koops, 2006;
Winner, 1980). However, it is not our goal to present a full scholarly
critique of a conference paper from twenty years ago. Instead, our goal is
to trace the development of a view that results in the explicit endorsement
of slavery as an ethical framework for managing robots. For our purposes,
the most relevant features of Bryson’s position in these early papers are
the claims that identification drives moral obligation, and that identifying
with AI is a mistake.
Neither claim is compelling. On purely psychological grounds, social
identification is unlikely to build models that are consistent enough to
serve as a basis for moral reasoning. Jenkins (2014) introduces the
psychology of social identity by explaining,
our classificatory models of self and others are multidimensional, unlikely to be
internally consistent, and may not easily map onto each other. Hierarchies of
collective identification may conflict with hierarchies of individual identification,
which means that the following might make complete interactional sense: I hate all
As; you are an A; but you are my friend. Taken together, these points suggest that
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categorical imperatives are unlikely to be a sufficient guide on their own, and that
the ability to discriminate between others in subtle and fine-grained ways is an
everyday necessity. (p. 6)

Bryson’s later work emphasizes that moral systems should be “coherent”
(Bryson, 2018a, p. 202), but this would be difficult to achieve if morality
were grounded on empathetic identification alone. Given the complex
psychological and political realities involved in the production of social
identity, it seems unlikely that “over-identification” (with machines or
anything else) is a serious threat to the social order. Nevertheless, Bryson
& Kime (1998) take the cultivation of appropriate identification practices
towards machines be a central concern in AI ethics, one which the
proposal in RSBS and later works aim to address.
For the sake of argument, suppose we accept Bryson’s first claim. If
identification is the root of obligation, then the psychological fact that we
identify with machines would suggest some prima facie obligations to
those machines. What justifies the claim that such identification is
inappropriate or mistaken? Bryson & Kime (1998) recognize that ethical
systems can be “somewhat arbitrary,” and that in novel circumstances (as
with AI), we are “to some extent free to create a new ethical standard” (p.
389). So why not take the supposed identification with machines as
evidence of evolving moral obligations? The authors defend their
resistance to adopting new ethical standards for machines with two
responses, one they describe as “technical,” the other “ethical.” Their
technical response argues that people tend to overestimate the capacities
of machines. Their ethical response argues that we already face a
resource allocation problem with other artifacts like “fine art and political
institutions,” (p. 387) where investments might draw resources away from
more pressing human interests.
Neither response addresses the issue at stake, which is how to decide
which identification practices (and which identities) are appropriate and
which are mistaken. As to the technical response: we identify not just with
other people, but with sports teams and brand names and superheroes
and all manner of things. The fact that we make errors about the
capacities of these entities says very little about whether our identification
with them is appropriate or not. When fans of an underperforming sports
team are unrealistically optimistic about their performance in tonight’s
game, this is not evidence that their identification with the team is
mistaken, inappropriate, or symptomatic of deeper psychological or
conceptual failures. The ethics of identification simply are not settled by
the accuracy of the predictions those identities generate.
This technical response is confusing, given that their proposal contains
better resources for addressing the concern: specifically, the evolutionary
drive to “social cohesion.” On this supposedly ethics-grounding biological
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imperative, the precise nature of the ethical system doesn’t matter so
much as its overall impact on social stability and (ultimately) the
reproductive success of the species. This would seem to raise an open
empirical question: does empathizing with machines make for a more
stable social order? Or perhaps better as an engineering and design
question: how do we design more stable social systems through the
natural empathy people have towards machines? (Wittkower 2020;
Carpenter, 2016; Darling, 2015) By insisting on a principled basis that the
identification with machines is a conceptual mistake, Bryson & Kime
(1998) cut off these possibilities and effectively limit the ethical discourse
in AI to controlling the frequency and impact of these “anthropomorphic
fallacies” (p. 390). In this spirit they claim, “The issue of forming identity is
now more than ever an issue for public education,” (p. 391) implying a
need for institutionalized policies to control how social identities are
formed and who we identify with. This interest in controlling the
identification practices and empathetic responses people might form
towards machines is a central pillar of the argument developed in RSBS.
Bryson & Kime’s (1998) second “ethical” response reveals an important
assumption in Bryson’s ethical perspective: that the evolutionary dynamics
of obligation are often zero sum, and that developing new obligations
towards AI would entail fewer obligations to and empathy with humans,
animals, and society generally. The risk is not simply that we mistakenly
identify with AI, but that we identify with AI at the expense of identifying
with humans; if obligation is zero sum, these identities are necessarily in
competition. Since they assume that social cohesion depends on our
empathy and obligations towards other humans, the over-identification
with AI is not merely inappropriate or distasteful; it is a direct threat to the
social order. The authors emphasize that this threat is not unique to AI,
pointing to the resources used to maintain the Mona Lisa that could be
used instead for people in need. Restating this argument, Bryson & Kime
are claiming that fine art threatens social cohesion (and ultimately our
evolutionary success!) by potentially generating more empathy and
resources for art than we have for other people. Their criticism of AI is that
it might pose the same threat to social cohesion as posed by fine art. One
might have thought that art provides a clear example in which
identification and obligation are not zero-sum, where we might be a more
stable, cohesive, and empathetic society because of the resources we
invest in public art. But for Bryson & Kime, producing fine art is a social
liability, a cost we accept, like car accidents, because of the pleasure and
convenience those artifacts bring us. This zero-sum perspective on
obligation is another major pillar of Bryson’s reasoning in RSBS and later
essays.
“Robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010a) was published as a book
chapter in 2010 after being solicited for a conference on “Artificial
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Companions in Society” at Oxford in 2007. Its publication coincides with a
burst of papers and conference presentations with titles like “Building
persons is a choice” (Bryson, 2009), “Why robot nannies probably won’t
do much psychological damage” (Bryson, 2010b), and “AI/robots should
not be considered moral agents” (Bryson, 2011). Together with the revised
“Just an artifact” (Bryson & Kime, 2011), these papers all expand on the
themes developed in “Just Another Artifact” (1998), emphasizing the
ethical risks posed by the over-identification with AI. Bryson’s work in this
period is not aimed at the subjugation of robots as such. Instead, her work
tries to correct what she sees as the conceptual confusion generated by
an inappropriate identification with machines, a mistake propagated by
science fiction narratives and self-described “futurists” whose doomsday
scenarios had become popular in tech journalism around this time. Bryson
recommends against the use of anthropomorphic robots in industrial
settings, and for policies that establish an unambiguous ethical hierarchy
that situates responsibility and ethical priority with humans over machines.
In 2010, Bryson participated in a joint EPSRC/AHRC (Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council/Arts and Humanities Research
Council) retreat with industry leaders and policy experts in the UK. This
retreat produced a set of “Principles of Robotics” (Boden et al., 2017),
which reinforces Bryson’s themes concerning the identification with
machines. Of the five rules laid out in the document, the first four largely
concern what robots are:
1: Robots are multi-use tools…,
2: Humans, not robots, are responsible agents…,
3: Robots are products…,
4: Robots are manufactured artifacts… (Boden et al., 2017, p. 125ff)

The principles propose industrial policies that clearly distinguish between
the capacities of robots and humans, advocating a purely instrumental
perspective on the former, and exclusively restricting the discussion of
agency and responsibility to the latter. As a policy document, these
principles give the misleading impression that the primary ethical risks
presented by industrial applications of AI and robotics are ontological
confusions over their agential status.
The rationale driving RSBS can now be brought into focus. Bryson’s
proposal takes for granted not only that humans should not be treated as
slaves, but also that no one would identify or empathize with slaves. For
Bryson, the “slave” is quintessentially an inhuman “other,” an archetype
that is characteristically beyond the scope of moral consideration or
empathetic identification. By calling robots “slaves,” and by treating the
categorical distinctions between humans and robots with the same moral
weight given to the distinction between humans and slaves, Bryson hopes
to counteract the excessive empathy we might feel with robots through the
attitude of abject disregard we “should” feel towards slaves. The call for
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robot slavery directly answers Bryson’s concern across several papers to
establish rigid identity hierarchies that formalize the ethical non-status of
machines. In RSBS, Bryson repeats earlier claims that “our identity
confusion results in somewhat arbitrary assignments of empathy” (Bryson,
2010a, p. 4), and lists a set of costs for both individuals and institutions
associated with the over-identification with AI (p. 5). Bryson describes
“being too generous with personhood” as a “moral hazard” (p. 7). She
rehearses the zero-sum reasoning,9 arguing that “humans have only a
finite amount of time and attention for forming social relationships” (p. 5).
While Bryson recognizes that the costs of identification “could be
negative,” she doesn’t spend much time discussing the social benefits of
empathetic identification with machines, or how to design technologies
that maximize these benefits.
Instead, Bryson uses the perceived costs to motivate what she calls the
“correct metaphor” for robotics: that “robots should be servants you own”
(p. 3). She says, “communicating the model of robot-as-slave is the best
way both to get full utility from these devices and to avoid the moral
hazards” (p. 8). RSBS lists “the fundamental claims of the paper” as:
1. Having servants is good and useful, provided no one is dehumanized.
2. A robot can be a servant without being a person.
3. It is right and natural for people to own robots.
4. It would be wrong to let people think that robots are persons. (p. 3)

As the list suggests, Bryson’s concern for dehumanization is mostly an
afterthought. She says, “Surely dehumanization is only wrong when it’s
applied to someone who really is human?” (p. 2). Bryson goes on to briefly
discuss the history of domestic labor in British villages from 1574–1821 in
a positive light, claiming that roughly 30% of households employed
servants. She justifies this practice by appeal to the inadequacies of an
unpaid gendered division of labor, saying, “Where wives and other kin
were not available to devote their full time to these tasks, outside

9

Bryson et al. (2017) recognizes the potential problems with zero-sum ethical reasoning,
but they appeal to it anyway, saying
While not always a zero-sum game, sometimes extending the class of legal
persons can come at the expense of the interests of those already within it. In the
past, creating new legal persons has sometimes lead to asymmetries and
corruptions such as entities that are accountable but unfunded, or fully-financed
but unaccountable. (p. 275)
Notice that this argument conflates the potential harms that result from the creation of new
legal individuals with the potential harms that may arise from expanding the category of
personhood.
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employees were essential” (p. 8).10 Bryson reflects favorably on the
current market for domestic labor, but argues,
the most difficult thing with human servants is of course the fact that they really are
humans, with their own goals, desires, interests, and expectations which they
deserve to be able to pursue (p. 9).

On the other hand, because robots “are wholly owned and designed by
us” (p. 9), they cannot be frustrated, exploited, or made to suffer unless
we deliberately design them with these capacities. So long as we aren’t
anthropomorphizing robots in ways that cause confusion or excessive
empathy, she says “owners should not have ethical obligations to robots…
beyond those that society defines as common sense and decency, and
would apply to any artifact” (p. 10). Bryson admits we have ethical
obligations concerning robots, about their safe operation and so on, but
we have no obligations to the robots themselves. Since robots are not
moral agents, destroying a robot is ethically equivalent to the destruction
of any property. In one of the more frustrating passages (p. 8), Bryson
suggests that people who aren’t comfortable with the metaphor of slavery
might instead adopt the perspective of extended mind theory (Clark &
Chalmers, 1998), where our tools are understood as extensions of our
own capacities. Bryson doesn’t consider that extended mind theory
encourages us to identify strongly with our machines (Ahuvia, 2005), or
how this might be inconsistent with her proposal for robots as slaves.
It should go without saying that the appeal to institutionalized slavery and
servitude as “good and useful, … right and natural” is profoundly
insensitive and simply in poor taste. It also highlights a deep theoretical
failure in Bryson’s ethics. Just as with the Mechanix Illustrated comic from
1965 quoted earlier by Ruha Benjamin, Bryson takes for granted that the
public would identify with slave owners rather than slaves, and with the
30% of the British who hired domestic servants, rather than the 70% from
whom they were hired. These assumptions speak to the substantial
challenges involved in grounding ethical policy in the collective
construction of social identity. Although Bryson makes token gestures to
recognize the historical cruelty of racialized slavery, she does not consider
how the metaphor of slavery might be interpreted by those who identify
more with slaves rather than with slaveholders. She also fails to consider
how a defense of slavery as a political institution might present a greater
hazard to the moral imagination than an overidentification with robots.
Fundamentally, Bryson does not think the problem with slavery is the
ideology of domination and oppression it represents; the problem with
slavery is that we were enslaving the wrong things.

10

If they were essential, what did the other 70% do?
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RSBS has received substantial scholarly attention in the AI ethics
literature (Agar, 2019; van Wynsberghe & Robbins, 2019; Gunkel, 2018b,
2015; Frank & Nyholm, 2017; Musiał, 2017; Prescott, 2017; Rainey, 2016;
Coeckelbergh, 2015; Neely, 2014). While much of this literature is critical
of Bryson’s insensitive language, few engage her theoretical approach
from the perspective of standpoint epistemology or critical race theory to
reflect on the role that racialized hierarchies play in the AI ethics
discourse. Consequently, the human supremacist framing developed in
RSBS continues to find endorsement in the literature. For instance,
Birhane & van Dijk recently state their “full agreement” with Bryson’s focus
on human well-being in RSBS, and disagree only to the extent that “one
cannot dehumanize something that wasn’t human to begin with” (Birhane
& van Dijk, 2020). The primary lesson Bryson has drawn from this
feedback is that “you cannot use the term ‘slave’ without invoking its
human history” (Bryson, 2015). Bryson has apologized for her insensitive
use of the word “slave,” but not for the oppressive ideology that language
articulates, or the abject disregard it shows for those who do not share her
identities or perspectives.
Indeed, Bryson’s recent work continues to develop the central perspective
of RSBS. While the explicit vocabulary of slavery has been dropped, the
focus on institutionalized identification policies and anthropocentric
ontologies remains. In “Of, for, and by the people: The legal lacuna of
synthetic persons” (Bryson et al., 2017), Bryson claims the “the basic
purposes of human legal systems” includes a principle that, “[s]hould
equally weighty moral rights of two types of entity conflict, legal systems
should give preference to the moral rights held by human beings” (p. 283).
Note the tacit assumption that part of the basic purpose of human legal
systems is to sort entities by type. Lest there remains any ambiguity in the
character of Bryson’s position, she describes it as, “an uncontroversially
light thumb on the scale in favor of human interests. Yes, this is
speciesism” (p. 283). Since humans and machines are not distinct
species, the term ‘speciesism’ is a misnomer; we suggest the term
“human supremacy” as a more appropriate characterization of this
position. In “No one should trust AI” (Bryson, 2018b), Bryson argues that
trust is a relationship between peers, and since we aren’t peers with AI,
“no one actually can trust AI” (para. 2, emphasis in original). In “Patiency
is not a virtue: The design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics”
(Bryson, 2018a), Bryson argues that “where possible there should be
minimal restructuring of existing norms” (p. 17), and that making robots
deserving of moral consideration “could in itself be construed as an
immoral action” (p. 16). These papers consistently argue that human
social cohesion is an evolutionary imperative that must be met with
institutionalized hierarchies which systemically privilege the “human.”
While the outright appeal to slavery has been suppressed, the logic of
human supremacy has, if anything, become more pronounced.
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In these papers, Bryson’s concern shifts from the overidentification with
machines as such to the more indirect threat that malicious corporate
actors could anthropomorphize machines to exploit both our empathetic
biases and legal loopholes around personhood. While the ethics of
corporate personhood is a well-placed concern, Bryson conflates this with
the supposed challenges of anthropomorphism and over-identification,
saying,
For example, customers could be fooled into wasting resources needed by their
children or parents on a robot, or citizens could be fooled into blaming a robot
rather than a politician for unnecessary fatalities in warfare. A corporation could
displace responsibility for its decision to use automation rather than human
employment onto the automation itself, creating a legal lacuna—a set of far poorer,
purely-synthetic entities set up to be held responsible for tax and legal liability (p.
23).

Outside of certain science fiction scenarios, it is not clear how these risks
are related. Corporate personhood and liability law do not depend on the
psychology of empathetic identification. Bryson does not point to any case
where anthropomorphic robots have been used to evade legal liability or
establish legal personhood. She does not explain how anthropocentric
ontologies or restrictions on anthropomorphic robots would prevent
corporate abuses of legal personhood. She takes for granted that human
supremacist policies would protect all and only the “correct” moral agents.
Bryson’s work in AI ethics extends beyond academic scholarship and
coincides with her rise to prominence as a public speaker and high-level
policy consultant. In 2017, Bryson was quoted calling the popular
humanoid robot Sophia’s award of Saudi citizenship “bullshit” (Vincent,
2017). The comment earned a public debate with Sophia creator David
Hanson at CogX 2018 (Estrada, 2018a).11 In 2019, Bryson was selected
to sit on the Advanced Technology External Advisory Council at Google
(Johnson & Lichfield, 2019). This council drew controversy for the
inclusion of Kay Coles James, president of the Heritage Foundation, a
conservative think tank known for promoting regressive policies on
immigration and LGBTQ rights (Knight, 2019). After an open letter from
immigrant and LGBTQ tech workers condemning the council led to
Google’s termination of the program, Bryson continued to defend the
council and her participation in it (Bryson, 2019b). Bryson also defended
James’s participation on the council, comparing the criticisms she and the
council had received to “bullying and shunning” (Bryson, 2019a).

11

The debate was initially marketed as between Bryson and Sophia the robot, until
Bryson objected on social media, and Hanson agreed to take the robot’s place on stage.
The debate itself largely concerned the virtues and risks of anthropomorphism in robotics.
See Estrada (2018a).
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Bryson has made clear that she does not share James’s political views.
We do not raise this minor controversy here to smear Bryson by an
indirect association with James’s foundation, but instead to reflect on how
corporate tech giants like Google cater to entrenched political interests
over the interests of people systemically marginalized by those politics. In
this context, it is notable that Bryson’s public response to the controversy
was to defend her work with James and Google over public outcry from
the very communities they target. Given Bryson’s scholarly concern for the
careful construction of social identities as a stalwart against corporate
abuses, and the emphasis she gives to human interests as a unifying
norm, one might be surprised to find her scolding public criticism in
defense of corporations and the xenophobic bigots they woo. However, a
close reading of Bryson’s work reveals a methodological interest she
shares with both Google and the Heritage Foundation: the systematic
identification and classification of agents into essentializing hierarchies for
purposes of political control. The same white supremacist reasoning that
motivates the Heritage Foundation to target immigrants and LGBTQ
people as political scapegoats, and which Google and other corporations
deploy for targeted advertising, surveillance, and policing (Cave, 2020),
Bryson has adapted as an organizing framework for policy and ethics
across the field of AI and robotics.
As surveyed in the introduction, Bryson is not alone or unique in her
explicit embrace of human supremacy as a moral framework. To some
extent, Bryson was in the right place when the AI boom hit to find success
in an industry and regulatory climate that was particularly receptive to the
vision of human supremacy developed in her work. To address this
broader milieu in which Bryson’s work finds success, we turn next to the
work of Rosi Braidotti and Charles Mills.

Reactionary posthumanism as ideal theory
Bryson argues that humanity is in the grips of an identity crisis. If so,
Braidotti’s framework of “the posthuman” (Braidotti, 2013) may help
diagnose the problem. For Braidotti, posthumanism marks our historical
condition, characterized not only by a “crisis of Humanism,” but also the
active exploration of “alternative ways of conceptualizing the human
subject” (p. 37). Braidotti identifies three strands of posthuman thought
that trace out different responses to our posthuman condition: one, a
critical posthumanism informed by anti-humanist philosophies of
subjectivity found in critical theory (Braidotti, 1994, 2002; Foucault, 1977);
second, an analytic posthumanism that develops through explorations of
the human in science and technology studies (Roden, 2014; Verbeek,
2005, 2011); and finally, a reactionary posthumanism for whom “the
posthuman condition can be solved by restoring a humanist vision of the
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subject” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 39). Analytic posthumanism would include, but
is not limited to, the transhumanist perspectives that motivate Singularity
theory in its many guises: as a science fiction plot device, as a
bioengineering design approach, and as a conceptual posit in academic
scholarship on future risks. In this sense, analytic posthumanism is an
implicit target of Bryson’s criticisms of Singularity theory. However, a full
critique of analytic posthumanism is beyond the scope of this paper. For
our treatment of Bryson’s constructive views, this section will focus on
Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism.
Braidotti associates reactionary posthumanism with Martha Nussbaum
(1998, 2010) who, Braidotti argues, “defends the need for universal
humanistic values as a remedy for the fragmentation and relativistic drift of
our times” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 39). For Nussbaum, this fragmentation is a
product of the socioeconomic condition of globalization, which threatens
humanity through the reactionary “plagues” (p. 39) of ethnocentrism and
xenophobic nationalism. According to Braidotti, Nussbaum believes that
the solution to these threats is a cosmopolitan universalism informed by
classical humanist ideals. Braidotti says that for Nussbaum, “abstract
universalism is the only stance that is capable of providing solid
foundations for moral values such as compassion and respect for others”
(p. 39). Nussbaum acknowledges the problematic historical use of
humanist ideals as a discriminatory or exclusive practice, and responds
with a call for a neo-humanism that centers the subjectivity of experience.
While Braidotti praises this nod to feminist critiques and methods, she
argues that Nussbaum, “reattaches [subjectivity] to a universalistic belief
in individualism, fixed identities, steady locations and moral ties that bind”
(p. 39). Braidotti says that due to this “disembedded universalism,
Nussbaum ends up being paradoxically parochial in her vision of what
counts as the human… leaving no room for experimenting with new
models of the self” (p. 39).
For example, Braidotti describes Nussbaum’s defense of a liberal
education (Nussbaum, 2010) as “elitist and nostalgic” (Braidotti, 2013, p.
173), noting that by the time of its publication, the university had already
been refigured in the market economy as a corporate structure (p. 150).
Braidotti is not disagreeing with Nussbaum about the value of a liberal
education as such, nor is she asserting the reactionary counter-ideal that
liberal humanism is necessarily bad. Rather, her point is to recognize how
the humanist ideals which ground Nussbaum’s defense are out of touch
with the material and institutional realities which benefit from that defense.
If universities are managed like for-profit corporations, this muddies the
narrative of the liberal ideals that the university supposedly represents.
Similarly, if the rhetoric of universalist humanism is used to protect narrow
and exclusive practices, it undermines the apparent universal appeal of
those ideals. In this way, Braidotti argues that Nussbaum’s nostalgia for
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humanist ideals operates as a defense of the very practices that subvert
them.
Charles Mills’s (2005) critique of the ideology of “ideal theory” provides
tools for thinking through this potentially confusing discursive situation. For
Mills, “ideal theory” describes not just the use of idealizations, which to
some extent cannot be avoided in theoretical discourse. Instead, ideal
theory describes the tendency to rely on “idealization to the exclusion, or
at least marginalization, of the actual” (p. 168). For instance, ideal theory
might concern itself with how an ideal society would structure its basic
institutions from an idealized “state of nature,” rather than addressing the
actual social circumstances in which its institutions operate. Mills claims
that ideal theory will typically employ assumptions that idealize human
capacities, social institutions, and social ontologies in ways that “abstract
away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and
oppression, which in reality, of course, will profoundly shape the ontology
of those same individuals” (p. 168). Mills continues,
It is obvious that ideal theory can only serve the interests of the privileged who, in
addition—precisely because of that privilege (as bourgeois white males)—have an
experience that comes closest to that ideal, and so experience the least cognitive
dissonance between it and reality (p. 172).

Restating the critique of Nussbaum in Mills’s terms, Braidotti argues that
reactionary posthumanism embraces humanist ideals to the exclusion of
the actual. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether
Braidotti’s criticisms are fair to Nussbaum’s views. What matters for our
purposes is Braidotti’s analysis of how a reactionary embrace of humanist
ideals in a posthuman context can operate on the ideology of ideal theory.
The institutional realities of a corporatized university system have real
consequences for the value of higher education, and this influence cannot
be elided by appeal to the merits of classical humanist ideals. Mills
explains that by “abstracting away from realities crucial to our
comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions
and social institutions” (p. 170), the reliance on ideal theory effectively
guarantees that those ideals will never be achieved.
Together, these analyses from Braidotti and Mills help to articulate the
critical failures in Bryson’s ethics beyond the mere insensitivity of her
language. Like Nussbaum’s, Bryson’s work can be read as an expression
of reactionary posthumanism, responding to the contemporary crisis of
humanism by asserting nostalgic, elitist ideals for traditional social
institutions and ontologies, such as “servants are useful and good.” These
ideals are themselves justified by idealized models of agency and social
cognition, and they aim to minimize disruption of the existing social order,
thereby protecting the systems of power that benefit from that order.
Where Nussbaum sees ideals of cosmopolitan discourse in a liberal
education, Bryson sees ideals of stability and clarity of identity in
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institutionalized slavery and strict social hierarchies. Bryson presents
herself as speaking on behalf of humanity’s interest broadly construed,
when in fact her proposals showcase a narrow and privileged perspective
that alienates those who don’t already share it. In so doing, she neglects
the political and psychological realities within which humans and
nonhumans share existence.
These analyses also help clarify an interpretive issue in the present
critique of human supremacy. Again, it is not our intention to condemn
anthropocentrism in AI ethics based solely on an abstract analogy with
white supremacy. The problem with human supremacy is not simply that it
replicates a superficial hierarchy of structural oppression. Instead, the
problem with human supremacy is how it operates as a defense of
entrenched power and oppressive ideologies, in a context replete with
examples of the systemic abuses of that power and the failures of those
ideals. The ontological distinctions proposed between humans and
machines are not simply modeled on traditional hierarchies of race and
gender, they function to extend, legitimize, and calcify them within AI
policy and legal theory. This is the fundamental risk of human supremacist
ideology, and it should be recognizable as a risk no matter how one feels
about anthropocentrist rhetoric or the moral agency of nonhumans.
Identifying robots as the “correct” targets of systemic abjection not only
justifies the logic, political utility, and technical infrastructure of oppression.
It also demands methods for identifying and classifying humans within that
framework, if only so they are not mistaken for robots. This is not unique
to Bryson’s specific articulation of the view but is endemic to the very logic
of human supremacy as a policy solution in AI ethics. Human supremacy
attempts to protect humans from systemic abuse by constructing a
political framework around systemic abuse and then declaring humans to
be a privileged category exempt from that abuse. In this way, human
supremacist advocates will inevitably find themselves committed to the
project of fitting humans within frameworks of systemic abuse. Likewise,
the entrenched powers which benefit from systemic abuse will naturally
find the human supremacist defense of stable power hierarchies
convenient, even flattering, and will inevitably find themselves promoting
its application as ideology in AI ethics.

Nonideal AI ethics
Are there alternatives to the ideal theory of reactionary posthumanism?
Following Mills, Serene Khader advocates for a nonideal universalism that
emphasizes the nonideal, unjust conditions of political action. Khader
says, “One defect of ideal theories… is their tendency to redirect our
evaluative gazes to the wrong normative phenomena” (Khader, 2018, p.
36). By directing our gaze towards the actual conditions of injustice,
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Khader argues that we will be in a better position to address those
injustices. Fazelpour & Lipton have recently introduced a nonideal
perspective to the AI ethics discourse on algorithmic fairness, arguing that
“non-ideal theorizing about the demands of justice is a fact-sensitive
exercise” (Fazelpour & Lipton, 2020, p. 10). While this is a step in the right
direction, we think the value of a nonideal perspective extends beyond an
emphasis on empirical methods. To push the analysis, this section looks
to Khader’s nonideal universalism for other lessons that might be adapted
to an AI ethics context.
Khader’s nonideal universalism is developed in the context of a diverse
transnational feminist movement, partly to address what she calls
“missionary feminism,” the idea that feminism requires the universal
adoption of Western liberal humanist values (p. 3). Since these values are
not universally shared, some critics argue that missionary feminism
continues the imperialist project of imposing Western values on colonized
communities. On the other hand, rejecting universal values seems to
entail a kind of cultural relativism that threatens to undermine feminism as
an inclusive normative project. Khader argues that this is a false dilemma;
feminists do not have to choose between imperialism and relativism. For
Khader, feminism is defined negatively, as an opposition to sexist
oppression. A nonideal feminism starts in conditions of injustice and seeks
to reduce or eliminate that injustice where it exists. This does not require a
shared commitment to Western ideals or any other background of
parochial values to serve as a normative ground for feminist solidarity.
Khader’s approach “rejects the notion that there is a single feminismcompatible cultural form, thereby undermining the idea that an idealized
Western culture is the feminist solution” (p. 7). However, this pluralist
approach does not commit feminism to a nihilistic cultural relativism.
Rather than focusing on disagreements between community ideals
considered abstractly, Khader’s nonideal approach recognizes that “the
effectiveness of strategies for change varies based on the material
conditions and moral vernacular(s) of a given context” (p. 4). Thus, a focus
on the actual, unjust conditions of sexist oppression opens space for
building a consensus toward practical steps that reduce or eliminate sexist
oppression, without demanding univocity in the background norms
informing this work.
AI ethicists who are sympathetic to the critique of human supremacy
developed in this paper may find themselves facing a dilemma similar to
the one Khader describes in the transnational feminist discourse. Like
missionary feminism, human supremacy continues and expands a
Western imperialist ideology that some ethicists will be hesitant to
endorse. However, abandoning humanist ideals may seem to leave us in
a moral vacuum, without conceptual guidance for protecting the interests
of persons and communities under genuine threat of systemic oppression.
This concern might simply reflect a parochial Western bias; as mentioned
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earlier, many indigenous or non-Western perspectives operate on nonanthropocentric ethical frameworks. Nevertheless, as a practical matter,
the international law and policy framework of human rights is not just
abstract, ideal theory; it is also an established institutional reality, one
which can mobilize material resources and direct international cooperation
in the service of real human interests. This is not to say the framework of
human rights achieves every ideal it aspires to, but simply that it is an
important and useful tool in the toolbox, one which would work better if it
were applied more consistently and inclusively, rather than if it were
whittled down or eliminated, at least absent better options on the table. If
the critique of human supremacy developed in this paper implies that the
framework of human rights is an imperialist project, some AI ethicists may
be tempted to bite the bullet and admit their preference for an imperialist
ethical regime.
However, Khader’s discussion of nonideal universalism suggests a way
for AI ethicists to avoid the apparent compromise of principle, where we
can productively engage an institutional framework like human rights while
rejecting the imperialist framings of reactionary posthumanism and human
supremacy. Following Khader’s nonideal universalism, we might construct
a nonideal AI ethics that begins in conditions of systemic oppression and
seeks to reduce or eliminate that oppression. This project does not require
a monolithic or exclusive idealization of human agency or cognitive
capacity. We can use the framework of human rights to protect the
interests of actual human communities without treating that framework as
a chauvinist characterization of the ideal rights-bearing agent, one which
might justify the exclusion, abjection, or oppression of other humans or
nonhumans. A nonideal AI ethics rejects the notion of a single ethicscompatible cultural form of agency or capacity, thereby undermining the
idea that an idealized Western anthropocentrism is the ethical solution.
This opens space for rethinking the sociotechnical matrix of human and
artificial agents in dynamic political terms, without being misdirected by an
impulse to comparison, exclusion, or hierarchy. Robots are situated within
existing sociopolitical structures to materially extend and reinforce
systems of domination and control, but they also encounter these systems
as a practical constraint on their operation, and so can also be mobilized
to resist, dismantle, and repurpose these systems. As such, robots may
already figure within normative communities as having varying degrees of
agency, complex social alliances, and relationships with other human and
nonhuman agents. A critical discourse on robots and AI in nonideal
conditions can recognize how overlapping structures of institutional
oppression situate robots as both agents and targets of power—as agents
whose identity and operation must be made available for inspection, public
scrutiny, and abuse (Romero, 2018; Smith & Zeller, 2017; Brscić et al.,
2015; Salvini et al., 2010). To some extent, the actual circumstances of
these arrangements and the moral vernaculars of the communities
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involved should play a role in our collective assessment of the robot’s
impact and value.
There are already efforts to reimagine the complex interdependent social
and political relationships between human and nonhuman agents
(Rahwan et al., 2019; Rainey, 2016). Crawford & Joler break down the
manufacturing, labor, and supply chains involved in the production and
distribution of Amazon’s Alexa, describing, “a vast planetary network,
fueled by the extraction of non-renewable materials, labor, and data”
(Crawford & Joler, 2018). They continue,
A full accounting for these costs is almost impossible, but it is increasingly
important that we grasp the scale and scope if we are to understand and govern
the technical infrastructures that thread through our lives. (para. 5)

The human costs of this technical infrastructure are visible in well-known
cases like the use of low-paid crowdsourced labor in machine learning
(Lung, 2012). They are also visible in more recent variations, such as
Kiwibots, a robotics company building delivery service robots in the Bay
Area. Kiwibots farms out the robot’s control task out to human operators in
Colombia who are paid less than $2 an hour, which owners claim is more
than the local minimum wage (Said, 2019). Such cases complicate the
idealized moral ontologies constructed around human individuals and
robot abjection. As Jackson (2020) says, “The more “the human” declares
itself “universal,” the more it imposes itself and attempts to crowd out
correspondence across the fabric of being and competing conceptions of
being” (p. 32). Resisting this imposition requires more than rejecting the
vocabulary of the human, it requires the moral courage to imagine
alternative relationships with being.
We end the paper with two brief examples involving the use of bots by
activist communities (Savage et al., 2016). The term “bot” typically has a
negative connotation in social media spaces, associated with spam,
trolling, and other malicious uses. This animosity has led to the word “bot”
being used as a slur or insult to attack the credibility of other people online
(Roth, 2018). But some bots are neutral or even helpful, such as bots that
automatically report earthquakes or tell jokes. Scholars have attempted to
systematically classify robot kinds into benign or malicious varieties
(Stieglitz et al., 2017). However, this idealized project runs into immediate
challenges in any practical setting. So-called “bot disclosure” laws have
faced objections from civil rights groups like the EFF, who worry that an
“across the board bot-labeling mandate would sweep up all bots,”
including those being used for protected speech (EFF, 2018, p. 1).
Suárez-Serrato et al. (2018) discuss the use of bots by human rights
activists in Mexico organizing around the #Tanhuato hashtag to evade
state censorship. They write,
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It is important to pause here and notice that in an instance like this it is not a clear
matter whether these bots were benevolent or malignant. It is a matter of
perspective. From the point of view of the Mexican armed forces, these bots are
acting against their honor. From the point of view of the CNDH they are promoting
access to a report of human rights abuse. (p. 2)

The #Tanhuato activists illustrate how the classification and alignment of
bots is already a political issue with direct implications for human rights.
This discussion does not hinge on armchair musings about far future
technologies, or misconceptions over machine agency. The discussion
arises from the actual conditions of injustice faced by persons under threat
of a surveillance state, and the role bots can play in navigating these
conditions. The crude algorithmic agency of Twitter bots evades state
censorship and retaliation in ways that contribute to resistance efforts; the
fate of these bots might even serve as synecdoche for the conditions of
injustice themselves, where silencing bots is silencing people.
The #botALLY community provides another example where the social
status of bots is an explicit object of political concern. When an update to
Twitter’s automation policy threatened to remove many prosocial bots
from the network, a community of bot developers successfully organized
around the #botALLY hashtag to pressure the company to change its
policy and allow certain bots to operate (smith, 2017). The developers
stressed not only the positive role these bots play in the community, but
also the bot developer’s responsibility for the bot’s operation and the
culture they produce. One developer and organizer, Darius Kazemi, built a
bot that tweets mashups composed by swapping the subjects from two
different headlines12. Occasionally, the mashup involved subjects of
different genders, resulting in automated headlines that appeared to be
making transphobic insults. On receiving feedback from the community,
Kazemi designed a word filter that would check for certain slurs or insults
before tweeting the results (Kazemi, 2015). He explained the importance
of an ethical code to the #botALLY community, saying, “I just don’t want
my bots doing things that I wouldn’t do myself” (smith, 2017, para. 6).
The #botALLY community shows how a close identification with robots
can motivate developers to take greater responsibility for their bots and
the cultures they (re)produce. This follows from an ethic that recognizes
robots as operating within a community for which its members take
responsibility. This recognition does not come at the expense of human
interests; on the contrary, identifying with machines puts the community in
a better position to address the interests of all its members. Like the
#Tanhuato activists, this recognition does not trade on anthropomorphic
exaggerations of machine agency. In both cases, the use of bots
demonstrates a technically sophisticated appreciation of the agential
relationships between humans, bots, and the systems of power they
12
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operate within. Kazemi says #botALLY has “always been a bit tongue in
cheek, not so much as friends of robots qua robots but rather as a banner
for a kind of white-hat art-bot maker” (personal communication, 2019 April
25). This playfulness with the boundaries of agency helps open the space
for critical reflections on a developer’s responsibility for their bots.
To these ends, Kazemi and the #botALLY community have produced
guidelines for bot developers looking to make prosocial bots (O’Leary
2016, Kazemi 2013). These guidelines include principles like “A bot is an
extension of its creator’s will” and “Bots should punch up” (O’Leary, 2016;
Richardson, 2013). Similar principles are elaborated in Microsoft’s
guidelines for “Responsible bots” (Cheng, 2018), which includes
suggestions like “Design your bot so that it respects relevant cultural
norms and guards against misuse” (p. 2), “Ensure your bot treats people
fairly” (p. 3), and “Ensure a seamless hand-off to a human where the
human-bot exchange leads to interactions that exceed the bot’s
competence” (p. 2). Microsoft’s guidelines come two years after their
public failure developing the chatbot Tay.ai, which quickly learned to
repeat racist hate speech on social media (Neff, 2016). Commenting on
the Tay.ai controversy, Schlesinger et al. (2018) echoes Haraway’s call to
“stay with the trouble”, arguing that
Critical issues cannot be addressed through neat separations between what
people do and how machines operate. In determining where we go from here, we
have to hold onto the complexities of our lived experiences, refusing to reduce the
world into something that is uniform or singular. (p. 9)

They go on to recommend ways of mitigating the harms caused by
chatbots, including developing “bots that are capable of recognizing and
responding to race talk in the near future” (p. 9), which they admit “is no
small task and there is no silver bullet” (p. 9).
These recommendations around the development and use of prosocial
robots can be understood as applications of a nonideal AI ethics, focused
on mitigating real short-term harms while avoiding idealized, monolithic, or
parochial solutions. The principles are generous with machine agency and
sensitive to fluid exchanges between humans and machines, while taking
seriously the developer’s responsibility for their robots and the impact they
have on the social dynamics in which they are embedded. Far from utopic,
these principles start from a recognition of existing conditions of injustice
and systemic oppression, and they seek to build robots that are
responsive to these conditions and operate in ways that minimize or
eliminate those injustices. For those of us committed to collective
empowerment without domination, these recommendations point us to
ways of including robots in this project.
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